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THE CANONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
TEACHING WITH A POLITICAL-
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Louis Fisher* 
In my writings on constitutional law, I make an effort to 
provide a broad context so that readers and students can better 
appreciate and understand a court decision. I want them to un-
derstand the conditions that give rise to a court case and how 
those conditions influence what a court eventually does, either to 
duck a case or decide it. I want them to understand the role of 
other institutions, particularly Congress, the President, and the 
executive agencies. 
I also devote considerable space to showing how the same 
constitutional issue is treated differently at the state level. By 
rejecting the "Supreme Court Only" model, I complicate the 
story of constitutional law somewhat, but this approach produces 
an account that is not only more accurate but more interesting. 
No one branch of government prevails. The process is polyar-
chal, not hierarchical. The latter, perhaps attractive for architec-
tural structures, is inconsistent with our aspiration for self-
government. 
The task of understanding these dimensions has been made 
easier by my association and friendship with Neal Devins. 
Starting first with lunches, followed by jointly-written articles, 
moving on to Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (now in 
its third edition), and with the completion of a book-length 
treatment of constitutional law in a democratic society, I have 
learned much about the ins and outs, the trends and patterns, of 
our legal process. Typically, after Neal and I battle out an issue, 
I am forced to return to my constitutional law text to rewrite sec-
tions and get it a little better. 
* Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The 
Library of Congress. 
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I. A RICH DIALOGUE 
In my textbook, American Constitutional Law,1 I do what-
ever I can, at every opportunity, to highlight the dialogue that 
exists among the judiciary, Congress, the President, the states, 
and the general public. The opening chapter sets the stage for 
these participants, including j.ssues of judicial capacity for mak-
ing social policy and the role of public opinion, lobbyists, and 
group pressures in identifying and defining constitutional values. 
Readings and boxed materials highlight Jefferson's position on 
the Sedition Act, Jackson's veto of the Bank Bill, and Lincoln's 
critique of Dred Scott. In Chapter 2, on judicial review, I pro-
vide many materials to keep Marbury v. Madison in its proper, 
limited place: statements by Madison, Justices Chase and Iredell, 
and John Marshall's letter to Chase, arguing that Congress, in-
stead of impeaching judges for their decisions, should simply re-
verse legal opinions "deemed unsound by the legislature," for 
that would "better comport with the mildness of our character." 
Other materials in these early chapters, including one on thresh-
olds, identify the many factors that limit judicial power. 
Throughout the rest of the book, I offer dozens of examples 
of this judicial-nonjudicial dialogue. Some constitutional issues 
never reach the courts, like the Ineligibility Clause (pp. 183-85). 
Two back-to-back readings explain how the Court strikes down 
the legislative veto but Congress-operating through committee 
and subcommittee vetoes-continues it (pp. 243-50); two read-
ings show how the Court decides some high-profile disputes over 
executive privilege (the Watergate case) but other courts en-
courage congressional committees and the executive branch to 
settle their disputes outside the courts (the AT&T cases) (pp. 
262-68); two readings illustrate how the Court can read presiden-
tial power broadly in Curtiss-Wright but Congress, in the Iran-
Contra report, finds Curtiss-Wright deficient in reasoning (pp. 
288-92); a box on page 347 explains how much Chief Justice 
Marshall in McCulloch borrowed from executive branch inter-
pretations on the constitutionality of the U.S. Bank; one reading 
has the Court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson (1956) offering views 
about preemption, while the next has Congress lambasting the 
Court's ruling, followed by the Court backing away in Uphaus v. 
Wyman (pp. 423-26). 
1. Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law (Carolina Academic Press, 3d ed. 
1999}. The fourth edition will be published in February, 2001. 
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So it goes. Although at times I have Congress championing 
and protecting rights left unsecured by the courts, I include 
readings to show how Congress has failed in its constitutional 
duties, as with the appropriations rider that led to United States 
v. Lovett (1946) (pp. 514-16). I also include congressional debate 
on the Sedition Act of 1798 (pp. 569-71 ). 
On religious freedom, I include President Clinton's 1995 
memo on legitimate ways of providing for religious expression in 
public schools (p. 697), and follow that with a reading from con-
gressional hearings in 1964 that helped build better support and 
understanding of the Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale, helping 
to forestall a constitutional amendment (pp. 701-02). When the 
Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) opened 
third-parties (including the press) to search and seizure, Con-
gress responded with legislation two years later to place restric-
tions on such practices. I give the background on this and in-
clude the congressional debate (pp. 789-91). 
The difficult area of electronic surveillance depends to a 
great extent on executive branch initiatives and legislation 
adopted by Congress (pp. 823-27). After the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Miller (1976) held that bank depositors were not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment when the government 
wanted to gain access to microfilms of checks, deposit slips, or 
other bank records, Congress passed the Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978 to offer greater rights and protections to depositors. I 
include a reading on the congressional debate (pp. 1097-98). 
In Mobile v. Bolden (1980), the Supreme Court held that 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 only prohibits states from pur-
posefully discriminating against the voting rights of blacks. I in-
clude a reading for that decision, but follow it with the congres-
sional debate in 1982 on legislation to allow plaintiffs to show 
discrimination not on intent but solely on the effects of a voting 
plan (pp. 1122-28). 
II. INDEPENDENT STATE ACTION 
Just as I emphasize the participation of all three branches at 
the national level, so do I show the actions of the fifty states and 
how they reach constitutional decisions that depart from and 
reject the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court. One of my favorite 
examples is the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington in 
1980 to exclude evidence from a trial, the ruling of the U.S. Su-
preme Court two years later to reverse and remand the state 
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court decision to allow the introduction of the evidence under 
the "plain view" doctrine, and the decision by the state supreme 
court in 1984 to resolve the issue solely under the state constitu-
tion and state laws, leading to the exclusion of the evidence and 
the rejection of what the U.S. Supreme Court had decided (p. 
22). 
On free speech in shopping centers, I have a box that lists 
the state courts that have decided to protect free speech more 
broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court does (p. 540). Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has supported the use of public funds to 
pay for textbooks and transportation for parochial schools, I 
have a chart on page 680 that shows the many states that reject 
such assistance by analyzing specific language in state constitu-
tions. These courts reflected on the "child benefit" theory of-
fered by the U.S. Supreme Court and found it wanting and un-
persuasive. I have a box on page 727 describing how state courts 
have rejected the Supreme Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama 
(1965), regarding peremptory challenges of jurors. 
The Supreme Court received great credit for its decision in 
Gideon v. Wainwright (1962), but state courts had recognized the 
need to provide counsel for indigents a century earlier (p. 750). 
On the issue of conducting search and seizure of trash and gar-
bage, some state courts have declined to accept such practices, as 
the Supreme Court did in California v. Greenwood (1988) (box 
on p. 796). Similarly, some state courts have parted company 
with the Court's decision in United States v. Ross (1982) regard-
ing warrantless searches of automobiles (box on p. 798). In 1992, 
the Supreme Court of Hawaii chose to adopt a principle of 
search and seizure more protective of individual rights than 
could be obtained from the U.S. Supreme Court (box on p. 801). 
A number of states have rejected the Supreme Court's decision 
regarding the Leon good-faith test (box on p. 838). 
In a box on page 921, I summarize the recent initiatives in 
such states as California, Texas, and Michigan to place limits on 
affirmative action policies. A box on page 1048 shows how a 
number of state courts have decided that restrictions on public 
funding of abortion, such as the Hyde Amendment at the federal 
level (upheld by the Supreme Court), are unacceptable under 
state constitutions. I include a reading on the House debate on 
the Hyde Amendment (pp. 1059-61). 
Although the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 
upheld a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, a number of 
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states have invalidated state statutes that criminalize consensual 
sodomy. I discuss those and include a box on the 1992 Kentucky 
decision, Commonwealth v. Sasson (pp.1087-88). 
III. OPERATING IN ALL THE BRANCHES 
Law students need this broader picture in order to function 
effectively after they graduate. Much of their time will be spent 
in litigating, or assisting in litigating, but when results in the 
courts are disappointing they need to know how to turn to other 
political institutions to seek satisfaction for their clients. 
A typical example is Nathan Lewin, who handled the yar-
mulke case for Captain Simcha Goldman. Lewin first tried to 
convince the Air Force to change its regulation to permit Cap-
tain Goldman, an Orthodox Jew, to wear his yarmulke while in-
doors on duty. When that failed, Lewin took the dispute to 
court, narrowly losing when it reached the Supreme Court in 
Goldman v. Weinberger (1986). Defeat was not the end of the 
road. Lewin next turned to Congress, which every year passes a 
military authorization bill. In 1987 he was able to get an 
amendment enacted that told the Air Force to change its regula-
tion, allowing people in the military to wear religious apparel so 
long as it does not interfere with their military duties. 
In setting this up in my textbook, I devote a paragraph to 
the basic ingredients of the dispute, including Justice Brennan's 
dissent that urged Congress to safeguard religious freedoms left 
unprotected by the Court (p. 642). Next I have excerpts from 
the Court's decision (pp. 648-50). I immediately follow that with 
the House and Senate debates on the legislation that would re-
quire the Air Force to change the regulation (pp. 650-53). The 
debate is not only instructive but amusing, particularly the futile 
"20-star letter" from the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposing the 
amendment (four stars for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
joined by four stars each for the General of the Air Force, the 
General of the Army, the General of the Marine Corps, and the 
Admiral ofthe Navy!). 
IV. PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS 
The yarmulke case is a good way to test the proposition that 
the judiciary is somehow better structured than legislative bodies 
to protect minorities. From James Madison to the present, it is 
widely argued that courts stand as sturdy sentinels to shield indi-
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viduals and minorities from unbridled majoritarian actions. 
Madison believed that by adding the Bill of Rights to the Consti-
tution, "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves 
in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights."2 It didn't 
turn out that way. For the first century and a half, individual 
rights were decided almost exclusively by the majoritarian proc-
ess. On the rare occasions when such issues were brought before 
the federal courts, judges were more likely to side with govern-
ment and corporations than with individuals.3 
While the record of federal courts in the past half century 
has improved, contemporary scholars continue to exaggerate the 
extent to which courts can be trusted to protect individual and 
minority rights. Insulated somewhat from political forces, fed-
eral judges are said to have the independence and technical ex-
pertise to defend constitutional rights, especially those of minori-
ties.4 The political branches and the general public-operating 
through legislatures that vote on majoritarian grounds-are sup-
posedly less sensitive to personal rights and liberties.5 It is said 
that political power must be invested in an unelected Court to 
protect minorities "from democratic excess. "6 In his famous 
footnote in Carolene Products, Justice Stone said that a "more 
searching judicial inquiry" may be required to protect "discrete 
and insular minorities. "7 
The Supreme Court's actual record in safeguarding minority 
and individual rights has never been that attractive or reliable. 
The Court barely began to sketch out a jurisprudence of relig-
2. 1 Annals of Cong. 457 (1789). 
3. See generally Henry W. Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control Over Con-
gress, 22 Corn. L.Q. 299 (1937). 
4. See Laurence H. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court 20 (Random House, 
1985) ("Even when the Congress and the President can be counted upon to defend most 
of us from the infringement of fundamental liberties, because the political majorities to 
which those departments of government answer demand such protection, the Supreme 
Court often stands alone as the guardian of minority groups. The democratic political 
process, by its very nature, leaves political minorities vulnerable to the will of the major-
ity. True, the Supreme Court's record in championing the cause of oppressed minorities 
is hardly unstained."). 
5. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 2 (U. 
Chicago Press, 1980) (" ... although judicial review is incompatible with a fundamental 
precept of American democracy-majority rule-the Court must exercise this power in 
order to protect individual rights, which are not adequately represented in the political 
processes"). 
6. William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Counter-
majoritarian Institution?: The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 87,87 (1993). 
7. United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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ious freedom until1940.8 Individuals and private organizations, 
in their efforts to protect their rights, often turn to nonjudicial 
bodies and the states for relief. Instead of the Court serving as 
the exclusive or even dominant guardian of individual rights, a 
powerful dialogue operates between judicial and nonjudicial 
bodies, with the courts often playing a secondary role. Caught in 
this crossfire, the Court can be overridden by a majoritarian pro-
cess that advances liberties beyond what is available from the 
courts. 
There should be nothing astonishing about the proposition 
that the Court has a limited role to play in protecting individual 
liberties. Congress, the President, and state governments have 
major institutional strengths and responsibilities and are fre-
quently driven by private groups that are well-organized and ef-
fective in articulating and advancing their values, preferences, 
and agendas. Despite the belief that majoritarian institutions 
cannot protect minority rights, Congress and the President often 
champion the cause of individuals who are rebuffed by the 
courts. As one study noted: "the Court has not been behaving as 
the counter-majoritarian force of its textbook description. It has 
instead been heeding quite carefully the policies endorsed by the 
majoritarian branches of government. "9 
I have readings from the flag-salute cases of 1940 and 1943, 
but my text makes it clear that the more generous reading of re-
ligious freedom comes from the broad public condemnation of 
the 1940 decision, not from any fine sentiments on the Court 
(pp. 639-40). Smith, RFRA, Boerne, and "Son of RFRA" give 
me an opportunity to again discuss the vigorous dialogue on re-
ligious freedom between the Court and nonjudicial institutions 
(pp. 657-58, 659, 667-78). 
Although constitutional law texts often concentrate on 
Brown v. Board of Education and subsequent cases to suggest a 
Court solicitous of civil rights, I devote many pages to the pre-
Brown record: the record leading up to and including Dred Scott 
(pp. 855-62); the progressive legislation adopted by Congress af-
ter the Civil War, some of which (particularly public accommo-
dations) was struck down by the Court (pp. 862-64, 866-69); the 
need for federal legislation to convert the principles of Brown 
into reality (pp. 875-78, 882-88, 907-08); and the combination of 
8. See generally Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
9. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The ERA and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1 Res. in L. 
& Pol'y Stud. 145, 154-55 (1987). 
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judicial rulings, executive orders, and congressional statutes re-
garding affirmative action (pp. 914-22). 
Similarly, the record of state and federal courts in protecting 
women's rights ranged from "poor to abominable" (Johnson & 
Knapp study in 1971). In sharp contrast, state legislatures and 
Congress as early as the 1870s began to enact many measures to 
support the rights of women to engage in various professions, in-
cluding law. This is impressive. All-male legislatures were vot-
ing in favor of women's rights. I devote substantial text and sev-
eral boxes and readings to drive home this point (pp. 945-57). A 
main purpose of the ERA, as Congressman Martha Griffiths 
said, was to tell the Supreme Court: "Wake up! This is the 20th 
century. Before it is over, judge women as individual human 
beings. "10 Much of what has happened since that time in pro-
tecting the rights of women consist of statutory initiatives (pp. 
957-65), in some cases to reverse such Court decisions as General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert (1976). I have a reading on the Senate's 
debate on women used in combat roles (pp. 985-86). 
V. COURT-CURBING EFFORTS 
As the final chapter of the cloth edition, and as the final 
chapter of both of the paperback splits, I conclude with a wrap-
up chapter "Efforts to Curb the Court." I open by rejecting Jus-
tice Stone's advice to his brethren: "the only check upon our 
own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." Judges 
operate within an environment that constantly tests the reason-
ableness and acceptability of their rulings. 
Earlier chapters identified some of the constraints that op-
erate on the judiciary: the President's power to appoint, the Sen-
ate's power to confirm, congressional powers over the purse, im-
peachment, legislative controls over court jurisdiction, and the 
force of public opinion, the press, and scholarly studies. The fi-
nal chapters cover constitutional amendments, statutory rever-
sals, changing the number of Justices (court packing), with-
drawing jurisdiction, and noncompliance with court rulings. 
I discuss, in the text and in a box, the statute that Congress 
passed in 1867 in response to Ex parte Milligan (pp. 1203-_04). In 
the section "Constitutional Dialogues," I analyze the vanous ar-
guments for judicial finality, include a box on Chief Justice War-
ren's challenge to the idea of judicial supremacy, discuss the flap 
10. 117 Cong. Rec. 35323 (1971). 
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over Ed Meese's speech "The Law of the Constitution" in 1986, 
and add an interesting give-and-take between Senator Specter 
and Judge Anthony Kennedy at Kennedy's 1987 confirmation 
hearing (pp. 1218-23). I set forth eight guidelines to qualify the 
last-word doctrine (pp. 1217-18). I conclude that judicial su-
premacy is incompatible with the value we place on freedom, 
discourse, and limited government, and that the dialogue be-
tween the Court and the rest of society is both constructive and 
stabilizing because it adds to public understanding and public 
support for constitutional values. 
VI. EDITING CASES 
Part of the headache (or challenge) in editing court cases is 
boiling them down. Certainly the reasoning process of the Court 
is important to include, but is that just the central reasoning or 
the side trips as well? I try to make room for both so the stu-
dents do not think judges reason in straight-line fashion. I also 
do what I can to include not merely dissents but significant con-
currences, especially when a "concurrence" looks a little more 
like a dissent or finds serious deficiencies with the majority or 
plurality opinion. 
Second, it is tempting to keep cutting existing case readings 
to make room for new ones, but I don't want to see cases like 
Marbury, McCulloch, Dred Scott, etc., chopped down to a few 
paragraphs. In my book, with oversized pages and two columns 
per page for readings, Marbury takes more than five pages, and I 
follow that with about three pages from Van Alstyne's "A Criti-
cal Guide." McCulloch runs more than five pages and Dred 
Scott is about five. The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 and Plessy v. 
Ferguson are about four pages each. A number of constitutional 
law texts give short shrift to these early civil rights cases, but I 
want to remind the reader of what the Court did in earlier days. 
VII. COURT DOCTRINES 
To simplify the student's task somewhat, I box up and 
summarize various Court doctrines: standing for Members of 
Congress (p. 14), the elements of standing (p. 90), the mootness 
doctrine (p. 106), the ripeness doctrine (p. 110), criteria for po-
litical questions (p. 114), major reasons for granting certiorari (p. 
158), delegation doctrines (p. 224), judicial standards for con-
gressional investigations (p. 253), what the Speech or Debate 
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Clause does and does not cover (p. 274), stages of federalism (p. 
379), the doctrine of vested rights (p. 441), free speech tests (p. 
497), forums for speech (p. 517), judicial guidelines for free 
speech cases (p. 522), acceptable and unacceptable regulations 
for the press (p. 573), libel doctrines (p. 596), obscenity doctrines 
(p. 613), protected and unprotected areas of religious liberty (p. 
638), the Lemon test (p. 653), acceptable and unacceptable fi-
nancial assistance to sectarian schools (p. 685), the complex area 
of double jeopardy rulings (p. 738), compelled testimony and 
tainted witnesses (p. 747), required and unrequired assistance of 
counsel (p. 751), habeas corpus relief for death-row inmates (p. 
773), standards for administrative inspections (p. 803), excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule (p. 836), stages in the racial inte-
gration of public facilities (p. 900), affirmative action principles 
(p. 919), standards of review (p. 958), permissible and impermis-
sible regulations for abortion (p. 1053), deviations from mathe-
mathical exactness for reapportionment (p. 1132), controls on 
independent campaign expenditures (p. 1172), and permissible 
and impermissible limits on campaign funding (p. 1173). 
